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Abstract
The size distribution of firms in each industry $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ usually be highly
skew, and empirical evidence shows that it is approximated closely by the
Pareto distribution. In this paper we make an attempt to explain why
the. Pareto law applies to the $\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}$ distribution of firms based on their in-
novation and investment behavior, and then develop amodel of economic
growth that take into account this empirical law. First, we show that the
Pareto distribution of firms is generated under the assumption that ffim
acquire the temolop of operating efficiently on alarger scale through
learning by doing, assd expand their scale of operation through the accu-
mulation of capital induced by profitability. Then, we construct amodel
of economic growth that is based on the Pareto distribution of firms and
economies of scale. In our model the growth rate is determined $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}\triangleright$
nously, and it exhibits scale effects with respect to savings. Our model is
different fiam the neoclassical growth model or the recently developed en-
dogenous growth models in that it takes into account the size distribution
of firms, and it yields quite realistic predictions.
1 Introduction
Empirical laws are rare in economics, and an example of them is given by the
regular pattern of some statistical distributions, such as the distribution of per-
sons according to the level of income or of business firms according to some
measurement of size such as sales or the number of workers. Many of those
distributions conform to the s0-called the law of Pareto. Many economists at-
tempted to explain the mechanisms that generate the Pareto distributions by
constructing models with stochastic procm. Simon (1955), Champernowne
(1953), Wold and Whittle (1957), Steindl (1965), etc., may be mentioned as
pioneers of such models. The most ingenious model among them is the one
developed by Simon (1955), which explains the Pareto distribution based on
two simple and meaningful assumptions: one is ’the law of proportional effect’,
and the other is the constancy of new entry. When his model is applied to the
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size distribution of firms, however, it is not clear how those assumptions are
related to the behavior of firms. Besides, there is no work, as far as Iknow,
that makes use of this interesting empirical evidence on the size distribution of
firms to analyze macroeconomic problems such as $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}o\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{I}}$ic growth or income
distribution
The first purpose of this paper is to explain why the size distribution of
firms is approximated by the Paretp distribution, based on the innovation and
investment behavior of firms. In our model we assume that new firms start
their operation from the minimum size, because they lack not only the neces-
sary know-how to operate efficiently at larger size, but also sufficient finance
to start on alarger scale. They gradually acquire the technology of operating
efficiently on alarger scale through learning by doing, and expand their scale
of operation through accumulation of capital induced by profitability. We show
that the size distribution of firms tends to be the Pareto distribution under such
assumptions. To my knowledge, there is no attempt, until now, that relates the
size distribution of firms to the learning by doing hypothesis. The laeming by
doing hypothesis was introduced into the growth theory by Allow (1962). Then,
Romer (1986) used Arrow’s set-up to develop an endogenous growth model with
increasing returns. The learnjng by $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}^{}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{g}$ hypothesis is regarded as one of the
analytical devices for explaining knowledge accumulation in endogenous growth
models. However, there is smoely any work, so far, that has applied this hy-
pothaae.\’is to more $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\alpha \mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{o}}^{4}\backslash$mioeUy based models. In this paper, we will show
that the learning doing hypothesis is $.\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\dot{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}$ appropriate for $\alpha \mathrm{p}1\mathrm{a}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}^{l}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{g}$ how the
size distribution of firms tends to be the Pareto distribution. Our model may
be characterized as akind of an evolutionary model instead of an equilibrium
model, because it is based on stochastic processes.
Our second purpose is to present amodel of growth and income distribution
that is based on the assumption that the size distribution of firms is appraxi-
mated by the Pareto distribution. That the size distribution of firms conforms
to the Pareto law is empirically well established. Simon and Bonini (1958) and
Ijiri and Simon (1964) (1971) (1974) apply this law to study industrial struc-
tures, and get many interesting results. However, this interesting $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\ddot{\mathrm{m}}.\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ law
is scarcely utilized in macroeconomic analyses. In this paper, we will construct
agrowth model that takes into account the size distribution of firms, and show
that our growth model can explain some structural aspects of economic growth
that previous models cannot explain. It should be noted that the size distrib-
ution of firms in our model is generated by learning by doing and investment
behavior of individual firms under stochastic processes. Thus, our growth inodel
assume akind of evolutionary process of growth for individual firms. It will be
shown that the growth rate of aggegate output is determined endogenously,
and it exhibits scale effects with resped to the savings rate. In this respect,
the properties of our model are different from the model of Solow (1955). It is
rather similar to endogenous growth models by Romer (1986) (1990) or Aghion
and Howitt (1992). However, it is pointed out $\mathrm{b}\dot{\mathrm{y}}$ Solow (2000) that the scale ef-
fects in those endogenous powth models are due to some arbitrary assumptions
about R&$\mathrm{D}$ processes. In our model, the scale effects will be shown to follo
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as anatural result of learning by doing and investment behavior of individual
firms in the process of growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2reviews the Simon’s model
of explaining the Pareto law and its generalization by Sato (1970). Section 3
shows that the Pareto law for the size distribution offfims can be explained from
learning by doing and investment behavior of individual firms. In Section 4, we
construct amacroeconomic model based on the Pareto law and the learning
by doing hypothesis, and analyze the determination of income distribution. In
Section 5, we extend it to agrowth model, and analyzes the steady-state prop-
erties of this model. It is shown that the steady growth equilibrium exhibits
scale effects, and that it is unstable. In Section 6, we show that the steady
growth equilibrium becomes stable if the substitutability between capital and
labor is taken into account, and then examine the effects of changes in structural
parameters. Conclusions are given is Section 7.
2The Size Distribution ofFirms and the Pareto
Law
In the Appendix of his book Steindl (1965) gives many empirical data which
illustrate the regularity and comparative stability of patterns found in the size
distribution of firms in $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}^{1}$. Those patterns are approximated
by the Pareto distribution which is given by
$N(x)=Ax^{-\rho}$ , (1)
where $x$ represents the size of firms, $N(x)$ the number of firms with the size in
excess of $x$, and $\rho$ is aparameter called the Pareto coefficient. The size of firms
may be measured by sales, capital or employment depending on the availability
of data. The above equation implies that the number of firms with the size in
excess of $x$ , plotted against $x$ on logarithmic paper, is astraight line. Figure
1shows the size distribution of the Japanese manufacturing industry in 1998
when the size of firms is measured by the number of employees. It is almost
entirely astraight line, illustrating the Pareto law quite $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}^{2}$.
The Pareto distribution is observed not only in the size distribution of firms
but in many other fields in economics, such as distributions of persons according
to income, distribution of cities according to inhabitants and so on. It is also
found in non-economic phenomena, such as the distribution of scientists accord-
ing to the number of papers published, the distribution words in abook and
so $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}^{3}$. Why such aregular pattern is observed in many fields is abig puzzle.
Attempts to reveal this puzzle have been made by many economists, including
Champernowne (1953), Simon (1955), Wold and Whittle (1957), Mandelbrot
(1961), and Steindl (1965). Among them, the solution given by Simon (1955)
seems to me the simplest and the most ingenious. In this paper we use the
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Simon’s model to extend it to agrowth model that incorporates the learning by
doing hypothesis and investment behavior of $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{s}$.
The Simon’s model was originally designed for anon-economic problem,
namely the distribution of words in abook. We interpret it here as the model
that explains the size distribution of firms. At any given moment, an economy
(or an industry) consists of alarge number of firms with given size distribu-
tion. We assume in the following that the size of each firm is measured by
its productive capacity, namely its output at the normal utilization of capital,
denoting it by $x$ . For analytical convenience we express the size of firms by
discrete numbers, putting the minimum size to be unity. E\’ach firm expands its
capacity over time, some firms growing more rapidly than others. The process
of $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}|$ of firms is assumed to be stochastic. Summing up the capacity of
all firms, we obtain the total capacity of the economy, which is denoted by $X$ .
Let us designate by $f(x,X)$ the number of firms whose capacity is $x$ . Then, we
must have
$\sum_{ae=1}^{X}xf(x, X)=X$. (2)
Simon makes two basic assumptions to prove the Pareto law. In the context
of the size distribution of firms, those assumptions may be stated as follows.
Assumption 1(the law of proportionate effect): The probability that
a unit increase in the total capacity of the economy frorn $X$ to $X+1$ is attributed
to fims $\grave{w}ith$ the size class $x$ is proportional to $xf(x,X)$ , $ie.$ , the total capacity
of that size class.
Assumption 2(a constant birth rate for new firms): There is $a$
constant probability, $\alpha$ , ffiat a unit increase in the total capacity ffom $X$ to
$X^{\cdot}+1$ is contributed by new firms which enter from the minimum size.
The’ first assumption is called ’the law of proportionate effect’, which was
originally proposed by Gibrat (1930) to derive the $\log$-normal distribution. It
implies that the $\alpha \mathrm{p}.\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}$$\mathrm{d}$ growth rate of afirm is independent of its size. The
second assumption means that new firms are being born in the minimum-size
class at arelatively constant rate. This assumption of aconstant birth rate for
new firms plays an crucial role in distinguishing the Pareto distribution from
the log-normal.
Under the first assumption, the law of proportionate effects, the expected
number of firms with size class $x$ when the total capacity of the economy is
expanded to $X+1$ is determined by
$E[f(x, X+1)]=f(x,X)+L(X)\{(x-1)f(x-1,X)-xf(x,X)\}$, $x=2,3$, $\cdots$ , $X+1$ ,
(3)
where $L(X)$ is the proportionality factor of the probabilities. The second as-




The proportionality factor $L(k)$ must satisfy
$L(X) \sum_{x=1}^{X}xf(x,X)=1-\alpha$. (5)
Substituting (2) into (5), we have
$L(X)= \frac{1-\alpha}{X}$ . (6)
Simon is concerned with steady-state distributions in which the expected
values in (3) and (4) coincide with the actual $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\Re \mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}$ . We thus have
$f(x,X+1)=f(x,X)+L(X)\{(x-1)f(x-1,X)-xf(x,X)\}x=2,3$ , $\cdots$ , $X+1$ ,
(7)
$f(1,X+1)=f(1,X)-L(x)f(1,X)+\alpha$ , (8)
where the $f’s$ may now be interpreted as-either expected values or actual fre-
quencies. Irom the definition of the steady-state distribution, we have
$\frac{f(x,X\dotplus 1)}{f(x,X)}=\frac{X+11}{X}$ for all x and X. (9)
This means that all the frequencies grow proportionately with $X$ , and maintains
the same relative size. The relative $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\alpha \mathrm{l}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}$ denoted by $f^{*}(x)$ may be defined
as
$f^{*}(x)= \frac{f(x,X)}{\alpha X}$ , (10)
where $\alpha X$ is equal to the total number of firm, $N$ , from the definition of $\alpha$ .
Thus, $f^{*}(x)$ represents the proportion of the number of firms with size $x$ in the
total.
Using (10) and (6), we rewrite (7) and (8) in terms of the relative frequencies
as follows:
$f^{*}(x)=f^{*}(x-1)$ $\frac{(1-\alpha)(x-1)}{1+(1-\alpha)x}$ , (11)
$f^{*}(1)= \frac{1}{2-\alpha}$ . (12)
Putting $\rho\equiv 1/(1-\alpha)$ , we obtain from (11) the following solution:
$f^{*}(x)= \frac{(x-1)(x-2)\cdots 2\cdot 1}{(x+\rho)(x+\rho-1)\cdots(2+\rho)}.f^{*}(1)=\frac{\Gamma(x)\Gamma(\rho+2)}{\Gamma(x+\rho+1)}f^{*}(1)$, (13)
where $\Gamma$ denotes the Gamma function. This is in fact the solution for the original
equation (7), since it is confirmed to satisfy (7) by dired substitution. Simon
called the expression (13) the Yule distribution after the name of a $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}.010\dot{g}\Re$
who derived this function to explain the distribution of biological genera by
numbers of species
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There is awell-known asymptotic property of the Gamma function that as
$xarrow\infty$,
$\frac{\Gamma(x)}{\Gamma(x+k)}\sim x^{-k}$ (14)
for any constant $k$ . It follows from (13), therefore, that as $xarrow\infty$ ,
$f^{*}(x)\sim Ax^{-(\rho+1)}$ , (15)
where $A\equiv\Gamma(\rho+2)f^{*}(1)$ is aconstant, and $\rho$ , the Pareto coefficient, must be
greater than unity as long as $\alpha>0$ . This result shows that the size distribution
function is approximated by the Pareto distribution for sufficiently large values
of $x$ , i.e., above acertain minimum size of firms. We can confirm that the
expression (13) is aproper distribution function. For we have
$\sum_{x=1}^{\infty}xf^{*}(x)\sim A\sum_{\not\in=1}^{\infty}x^{-\rho}$ , (16)
and this expression is convergent if $\rho>1$ . But this condition is satisfied as long
as the birth rate of new firms, $\alpha$ , is positive.
The result obtained above may be summarizd by the following proposition:
Proposition 1(Simon): Under assumption 1(the law of proportionate
effect) and assumption 2(a constant birth rate of newfirms for newfirms) stated
above, the size distribution of firms $\dot{u}$ asymptotic to the Pareto. distribution,
namely, almost identical with the Pareto distribution for firms above a certain
minimum size.
Simon’s model was extended by Sato (1970) to include the case where the
law of proportionate effect in the usual sense does not apply in an exact sense.
He replaces Assumption 1by the following assumption:
Assumption 1’ (the generalized law of proportionate effects): The
probability that a unit increase in the total capacity of ffie economy ffom $X$ to
$X+1$ is attributed to fims uriM size class $x$ is proportional to $(ax+b)f(x,X)$ ,
There $a$ and $b$ are constant and subject to the following restrictions:
$\sum_{\mathrm{r}=1}^{X}(ax+b)f(x,X)=\sum_{x=1}^{X}xf(x,X)=X$. (17)
This assumption generalizes the law of proportionate effect by including it
as aspecial case where $a=1$ and $b=0$. Otherwise, the expected rate of afirm
is not independent of its size, but increases or decreases with it. Sato (1970)
shows, with this assumption together with Assumption 2, that $.\mathrm{t}$he steady-state
distribution becomes as
$f^{*}(x)= \frac{\Gamma(x+_{a}^{\mathrm{g}})\Gamma(_{0}^{rightarrow b}+2)}{\Gamma(x+\rho=_{a}+1+b)}f^{*}(1)$, (18)
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where a f b $>0$ is required for this value to be finite. From the asymptotic
property of the Gamma function, we have, as x $arrow\infty$ ,
$f^{*}(x) \sim B(x+\frac{b}{a})^{-_{4}^{\mathrm{g}}-1}$ , (19)
where $B$ is aconstant. This is called the Pareto distribution of the second kind,
which is one of three forms of size distributions originally proposed by Pareto.
The size distribution of the form (15) is called the Pareto distribution of the
first kind.
The distribution function (19), when plotted on logarithmic paper, is not ex-
actly astraight line. Notice, however, that this distribution function is rewritten
as
$B(x+ \frac{b}{a})^{-_{\mathrm{B}}^{\rho}-1}=Bx^{-\iota_{-1}}.(1+\frac{b}{ax})^{-_{\mathrm{B}}^{l}-1}$ , (20)
and that for any given value of $a$ and $b$ , we have $1+(b/ax)arrow 1$ as $xarrow\infty$ . It
follows, therefore, that as $xarrow\infty$,
$f^{*}(x)\sim Bx^{-\iota_{-1}}.$. (21)
Thus, the Pareto distribution of the second kind is asymptotic to that of the
first kind with the Pareto coefficient of $\rho/a$.
Substituting (10) into (17) and rewriting it, we have, as $Xarrow\infty$ ,
$(1-a) \sum_{x=1}^{\infty}xf^{*}(x)=b\sum_{x=1}^{\infty}f^{*}(x)$ , (22)
so that
$\frac{1-a}{b}==\frac{N}{X}\overline{\overline{\sum_{\mathrm{r}=1}^{\infty^{\mathrm{r}_{-}^{-1}}}}}\sum_{xf^{\mathrm{s}}(x)}\infty_{f^{*}\underline{(x)}}$. (23)
But, since $N/X=\alpha$ , we obtain
$\frac{1-a}{b}=\alpha$ , (24)
which is the relation $a$ and $b$ are subject to. Considering that $\alpha>0$ , we must
have
$a \frac{\geq}{<}1$ according as $b \frac{\leq}{>}0$. (25)
Assumption 1’ implies that the expected growth rate of afirm with size $x$
is proportional to $a+(b/x)$ . Therefore, the expected growth rate of afirm is
independent of its size, if and only if $a=1$ and $b=0$. It increases with its size
if $a>1$ and $b<0$ , and it decreases with its size if $a<1$ and $b>0$ . The Pareto
coefficient $\rho/a$ is different from $\rho=1/(1-\alpha)$ except for the case $a=1.\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}$
results may be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2(Sato): Under Assumption 1’ anti Assumption B stated
above, the size distribution of firms is as ymptotic to the Pareto $d\dot{w}tr\cdot buh.on$.
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Depending on the values of $a$ and $b$, we can distinguish the folloing three
cases:
(a) If $a=1$ and $b=0$ , the $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} ected$ growth rate of a firm is independent of
size. The Pareto coefficient is equal to $\rho=1/(1-\alpha)$ as Simon demonstrated.
(b) If $a>1$ and $b<0$ , the expected growth rate of a firm proportionately
increases with size. The Pareto coefficient is less than $\rho$ .
(c) If $a<1$ and $b>0$ , the expected growth rate of a firm proportionately
declines with size. The Pareto coefficient exceeds $\rho$ .
In order to see how these different cases occur, we have to relate the model
to the innovation and investment behavior of firrrp.
3Learning by Doing and the Pareto Law
In the last section we have reviewed Simon’s model and its extension by Sato
to see how the size distribution of firms becomes the Pareto distribution. The
essential element common to the models is stochastic processes. In particular,
the main assumptions governing such stochastic processes are the law ofpropor-
tionate effect (or its variation) and aconstant birth rate for new firms. Though
these assumptions are simple and interesting, there are scarcely any discussion
so far made to justify them by more basic hypotheses on the behavior of firms or
the cost conditions of firms. In this section we attempt to give amicroeconoxnic
foundations, so to say, for the above model.
The standard theory of the firm we learn in the ordinary textbook is the
neoclassical theory of the firm. In the neoclassical theory of the firm, it is
assumed that the $\mathrm{U}$-shaped curve, $LAC$, illustrated in Figure 2is the long-
run average cost curve of all firms in aparticular industry, freely available to all
including new entrants. It is not by empirical observation but by the assumption
of perfect competition that the theory requires the long-run average cost to be
$\mathrm{U}$-shaped. If it is $\mathrm{U}$-shaped, the size distribution of firm is expected to become
anormal distribution around the optimum size at which the long-run average
cost is minimum. But empirical data for many countries including Japan show
that the size distributions of fircns are highly skew, approximated closely by
the Pareto distribution. This implies that the neoclassical theory of the firm is
inconsistent with empirical observations on the size distribution of firms. The
crucial assumptions leading to such unrealistic results are perfect knowledge of
technology and perfectly competitive supply of $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}^{4}$. We make changes in
these two assumptions for the sake of realism, and develop acompletely different
theory of the firm. In our model developed below, we assume that knowledge
of technology is imperfect and that outside finance is limited by the amount of
retained profits.
Let us first explain the assumption that technological knowledge is imper-
fect. This assumption seems to be quite plausible. For much of technoloy–
commercial, financial, organizational, and physical–at any moment of time is
essentially private in the sense that it is acquired by efforts made by each firm
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and technology thus accumulated is different between firms. Afirm has to mas-
ter the technology of operating efficiently on alarger scale by trial and error, in
the course of which.a firm may acquire the additional technology. It is aprocess
of learning by doing. Private technology gradually becomes more or less public
through being copied by competitors. But all technological improvements are
initially private, since they start by being the results of efforts made by asingle
enterprise. They do not fall like manna ffom heaven as the neoclassical theory
assume.
To describe the process of knowledge accumulation, we will adopt Arrow’s
formulation of learning by doing. Arrow (1962) presented amodel of economic
growth based on the learning by doing hypothesis. In his model productivity
increases through learning process. Learning is regarded as the product of ex-
perience, and as an index of experience Arrow chooses cumulative investment
in the economy as awhole. Our model adopts his basic idea, but $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\varpi \mathrm{s}$ from
his model in two respects. First, in Arrow ’s model, the learning is embodied
in the new capital goods, while, in our model, it takes place in each firm with
different size. Arrow’s model is avintage model in which technical change is
completely embodied in new capital goods. At any moment of $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e},.\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ new
capital goods incorporate all knowledge then available, but once buiR their pr0-
ductive efficiency cannot be $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\alpha \mathrm{d}$ by subsequent learning. Contrastively, in
our model, firms with different size and different efficiency coexist at any m0-
ment of time, the great majority of firms being stil of smal or medium size.
Most firms have tendency to expand their scales over time by mastering tech-
nology through learning by doing. Profitable&ms tend to $g\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ at higher rates
than unprofitable firms, the proccess of which is stochastic.
Another difference between our model and Arrow’s concerns an index of ex-
perience. For convenience of our analysis, we use capacity output of firms as an
index of $\mathrm{a}\iota \mathrm{p}\alpha \mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}.\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ of cumulative investment as Arrow does. Many em-
pirical studies have shown that cumulative output is agood index of experience.
But, under the assumption that output is increasing exponentially, current out-
put is proportional to cumulative output. Since current output of afirm is equal
to its capacity output in our model, the latter may be an appropriate index of
experience.
The learning curves may be different firm by firm, since some firms are
more fficient in learning than others. Therefore, different firms will usually
follow different paths in learning by doing. We assume, however, that alearning
function of atypical firm with productive capacity $x$ is expressed as $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}o\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$:
$\frac{l(x)}{x}=\gamma(x)$ , $\gamma’(x)<0$, x $\in[1,X]$ , (26)
$\frac{k(x)}{x}=\delta(x)$ , $\delta’(x)\leq 0x\in[1, X]$ . (27)
The notations are as follows: $l(x)$ is the mount of labor uffi in the prduction
by typical firm with size $x$, $k(x)$ is the amount of capital used in the prduction
by atypical firm with size $x$ , $\gamma(x)$ is adecreasing function, and $\delta(x)$ is a non-
increasing function. Apair of equations (26) and (27) means that as atypical
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firm with size $x$ expands the scale, the amount of labor used per unit of output
decreases while the amount of capital used per unit of output stays constant or
decreases. Therefere, regardless of wages and rental value of capital, it always
pay for the firm to expand its scale.
To simplify the analysis without loss of reality, we will specify the above
learning function as follows:
$\gamma(x)=cx^{\lambda-1}$ , $0<\lambda<1$ , x $\in[1,X]$ , (28)
$\delta(x).=dx^{\mu-1}$ , $0<\mu\leq 1$ , x $\in[1,X]$ . (29)
Then, inputs of labor and capital as functions of capacity output becomes as
follows:
$l(x)=a^{\lambda}$ , $0<\lambda<1$ , $x\in[1,X]$ , (30)
$k(x)=dx^{\mu}$ , $0<\mu<1x\in[1,X]$ . (31)
It is verified that these relations fit quite well to the data of Japanese manufac-
turing industr\’iaae.9
Under the learning function expressed by apair of equations (28) and (29),
there will be an inherent tendency for firms to grow in size over time, because
entrepreneurs expect to enjoy economies of scale by expansion. However, it
should be noted that the above learning function is not agiven schedule perfectly
known to firms. Since knowledge of technology is imperfect, the additional
technology for operating efficiently on alarger scale can be acquired only through
aprocess learning by doing. Imperfect knowledge of technology acts as abrake
on expansion of firms.
Another brake is that such afirm must raise the $\mathrm{n}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ finance for expan-
sion. The sources of finance for investment of firms consist of retained profits,
iae\’uae of equity or bond, and borrowing from banks. The retained profits of
firms are bounded by their expected profits. If the amount of investment afirm
desires to carry out exceeds retained profits, it has to raise outside finance in the
form of equity, bond or borrowing fiom banks. Normally, there will be limits to
the amounts that can be raised in this way, or penalty rates to be paid beyond
certain remits. The total amount of extra finance raised externally will tend to
be limited by the amount of retained profits. Most firms, especially those of
small or medium size, the extent of future expansion depends on the volume of
previously accumulated profits. Therefore, the expected rate of profit is akey
variable as the determinants of the expected rate of growth of afirm. Assum-
ing that the learning function of atypical firm with size $x$ is give by apair of
equations (30) and (31), we can express its rate of profit as follows:
$e(x)= \frac{x-wl(x)}{k}=\frac{x-wa^{\lambda}}{dx^{\mu}}=\frac{1}{d}x^{1-\mu}-\frac{c}{d}wx^{\lambda-\mu}$ , x $\in[1,X]$ , (32)
where $w$ denotes the wage rate.
The average wage per worker tends to be an increasing function with respect
to the size of firms, although not to the same degree as decreases of labor input
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One reason for this is that larger firms will usually have amore detailed division
of labor, with alarger proportion of higher-paid skilled or managerial workers.
Another reason is that trade unions are usually more powerful in larger firms,
and may succeed in extracting part of extra profit created by economies of scale.
Because of these reasons, we assume that the average wage rate increases with
the size of firms according to the following $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$:
$w(x)=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}(1)x’$ , where $\omega$ $>0$ , x $\in[1,X]$ . (33)
To $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{h}.\Phi$ the following analysis, we assume $\mu=1$ in equation (31). In
other words, the capital-0utput ratio is assumed to be constant independently
of the size of firms. This assumption is approximately supported by the actual
data of Japanese manufacturing $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{y}^{8}$. With this assumption and (33), the
rate of profit of atypical firm with size $x$ becomes as follows:
$e(x)= \frac{1}{d}\{1-w(1)\alpha^{\lambda+\mathrm{I}v-1})$ , x $\in[1,X]$ . (34)
As is obvious ffom this function, the rate of profit is constant irrespective of the
firm size if $\lambda+\omega=1$ . When $\lambda+\omega\neq 1$ , the rate of profit increases or decreases
with firm size $x$ depending on whether $\lambda$. $+\omega$ $<1$ or $\lambda+\omega>1^{9}$.
The incentive of firms to expand arises ffom the prospect of improving their
profitabilty by increasing their scale of operation. The accumulated profits can
be usae for further expansion either directly or as security for raising exter-
nal finance. We assume, therefore, that the expected growth rate of capital,
$E(\Delta k/k)$ of atypical firm with size $x$ depends on the rate of profit earned by
the firm, $e(x)$ . Notice that $E(\Delta k/k)=E(\Delta x/x)$ is obtained ffom (31), since we
assume $\mu=1$ . Hence, the $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\infty \mathrm{t}\mathrm{d}$ growth rate of capacity output, $E(\Delta x/x)$ ,
depends on $e(x)$ . Specifying this relation to be linear, we have
E $( \frac{\Delta x}{x})=\tau+\xi e(x)$ , where $\tau>0$ , $\xi>0$ , x $\in[1,$X]. (35)
Substituting (34) into (35), we can express (35) as follows:
$E( \frac{\Delta x}{x})=\tau+\frac{\xi}{d}(1-wa^{\lambda+\omega-1})=p-qx^{\lambda+\omega-1}$, (36)
where $p\equiv\tau+\xi/d$ and $q\equiv\xi wc/d$ , both being constant. In order that the
expectd rate of growth to be positive for typical minimum firmwhose capacity
output $x$ is equal to 1, we must have $p>q$ . We assume this condition to hold
in the following.
Let us first consider the case where $\lambda+\omega$ $=1$ . In this case, the expected
rate of capacity output becomes as
E $( \frac{\Delta x}{x})=p-q$, (37)
where p-q is constant. In other words, the expected rate of gowth of afirm is
independent of its size x. In this case, Assumption 1in Simon’s model, that is
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’the law of proportionate effect’, applies to our model. We may also assume that
all new firms start their operations from the minimum size. This assumption
seems plausible in our model, because the two brakes mentioned above will ffiect
not only existing firms but also new firms. First of all, since new entrants do not
have the necessary know-how to operate efficiently at large size from the start,
they have to enter the industry from the minimum size. Secondly, new entrants
usually cannot raise sufficient finance to start on alarge scale. These reasons
justify the assumption that all new firms make entries ffom the minimum size.
In addition, we assume that the birth rate of new firms is constant. Then,
Assumption 2in Simon’s model, aconstant rate of entry of new firms from the
minimum size, also applies to our model. Therefore, due to Proposition 1, the
size distribution of firms in our model becomes the Pareto distribution of the
form (15).
This result may be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Suppose that new firms are being born in me smallest-size
class, and that they account for a constant rate $\alpha$ of an increase in the total
capacity output of the economy. Suppose also that a $t\mathfrak{M}^{\dot{l}}calffim$ of each size class
masters technology of operating more efficiently on a larger scale by learning by
doing as represented by $(S\theta)$ and (SI), and that its rate of expansion depends
on the rate of profit as is expressed by (36). $\mathrm{I}.\hslash e\eta\dot{l}f\lambda+\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}$ $=1$ , the size
distribution offirms converges to the Pareto distribution of the form (15), and
the Pareto coefficient $\rho$ is equal to $1/(1-\alpha)_{:}$
In this proposition, the condition $\lambda+\omega=1$ implies that the unit wage cost
for the average firm at each size class as well as its gross profit rate is constant
irrespedive $0.\mathrm{f}$ size. Since $\lambda<1$ , entrepreneurs expect to enjoy economies of
scale by expansion. But, as $\omega=1-\lambda$ , the wage rate increases with size just to
offiet the scale economies. The law $\dot{\mathrm{o}}\mathrm{f}$ proportionate effect applies as the result.
Let us next consider the case where $\lambda+\omega\neq 1$ . In this case, as is obvious
from (36), the expected rate of growth of afirm increases or decreases with size
$x$ depending on whether $\lambda+\omega$ $<1$ or $\lambda+\omega>1$ . The problem is how to relate
these cases to Assumption 1’ in Sato’s model. $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}^{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}(36)$ can be rewritten
as
$E(\Delta x)=px-qx^{\lambda+w}$. (38)
Linearizing the righthand side of this equation around acertain valqe of $x$
denoted by $x^{*}$ , we obtain
$E(\Delta x)=p(x$ -x’) $-(\lambda+\omega)q(x$ -x.) $=(p-q) \frac{p-(\lambda+\omega)q}{p-q}(x-x^{*})$, (39)
where we assume p $>(\lambda+\omega)q$ in order to focus on economicaly meaningful
case. The above equation can be rewritten as
$E(\Delta x)=(p-q)(ax+b)$ or E $( \frac{\Delta x}{x})=(p-q)(a+\frac{b}{x})$ , (30)
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$a \equiv\frac{p-(\lambda+\omega)q}{p-q}$ , $b \equiv\frac{p-(\lambda+\omega)q}{p-q}x^{*}$ . (41)
In addtion, we assume that $a$ and $b$ defined by (41) satisfy (24). Then, the value
of $x^{*}$ is determined as
$x^{*}= \frac{a-1}{a\alpha}$ . (42)
Therefore, $a$ and $b$ are determined by the parameters that are given in our
model. Rrom (41) and (42), we can confirm that if $\lambda+\omega<1$ , then $a>1$ and
$b<0$, while if $\lambda+\omega>1$ , then $a<1$ and $b>0$ .
Equation (40) implies that the expected growth rate of afirm with size $x$ is
proportional to $a+b/x$. In this case, Assumption 1’ in Sato’s model, that is the
generalized law of proportionate effect, exactly applies to our inodel. Therefore,
due to Proposition 2, the size distribution of firms in our model becomes the
Pareto distribution $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\ddot{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ form (19).
This result may be summarized by the following proposition:
’
Proposition 4: Let us moke the same assumptions as in $Propo\dot{\Re}tto\dot{n}S$ ex-
cept $\lambda+\omega=1$ . Then, the size distribution of $m$ converges to the Pareto
$d\dot{u}$$m.bu\hslash.on$ of the form (19), the Pareto coefgcient being equal to $\rho/a$. Depend-
ing on whether $\lambda+\omega<1$ or $\lambda+\omega$ $>1$, we can distinguish the following two
cases:
(a) If $\lambda+u/$ $<1$ , then $a>1$ and $b<0$, in which case, the expected growth
rate increases with size, and the Pareto coefficient $u$. less than $\rho=1/(1-\alpha)$ .
(b) If $\lambda+\omega>1$, then $a<1$ and $b>0$, in which case, the expected growth
rate decreases with size, and the Pareto coefficient $exoe\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ $\rho=1/(1-\alpha)$ .
In this proposition, the condition $\lambda+\omega<1$ implies that the unit wage
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}$ for an average firm at each size class decreases and its grin profit rate
increases with size. Thus, the expected gowth rate $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\alpha \mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}$ with size. The
exact opposite holds for the case $\lambda+\omega$ $>1$. It should be noted, however, that,
even if the gross profit rate is decreasing with size, the level of gross profits $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$
increase as long as $xe(x)$ increases with $x$ . Therefore, even in the case where
$\lambda+\omega$ $>1$ , firms may have some incentives to expand, though the growth rate
is decreasing with size. Even if it is so, however, equation (38) implies $\dot{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}$
expansion will stop at the capacity output $x\#$ such that $x\#$ $=(p/q)^{1/(\lambda+u-1)}’$ .
Moreover, it is quite unrealistic to assume that $\lambda+\omega$ $>1$ holds for the whole
range of size classes, because the rate of profit becomes highest for aminimum
size firm in this case. Therefore, we assume that $\lambda+\omega\leq 1$ holds in the following
discussion.
4Determinants of Income Shares
It has been shown in the previous section that the size distribution of firms
converges to the Pareto distribution under the quite plausible assumptions on
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the behavior of firms about technology and investment. In this section, we
will turn to the analysis of the economy as awhole. We assume that the size
distribution of firms is approximated by the Pareto distribution in the economy
as awhole. We also assume that learning function described by (30) and (31)
is applicable to the whole economy.
When the size distribution of firms is approximated by the Pareto distribu-
tion over the entire range, the number of firms with capacity output $x$ , denoted
by $n(x)$ , can be expressed by the following frequency function:
$n(x)=\rho Ax^{-(\rho+1)}$ , $(\rho>1,$A $>0)$ . (43)
The Pareto coefficient $\rho$ is determined by the birth rate of new firms $\alpha$ and the
scale factor, $a$, as $\rho=1/a(1-\alpha)$ .
Denoting capacity output of the minimum size firm by $x_{0}$ and that of max-
imum size firm by $x\tau$ , we can express the total number of firms, $N$, as follows:
N $= \int_{x\mathrm{o}}^{x\tau}n(x)dx=A(x_{0}^{-\rho}-x_{T}^{-\rho})$. (44)
Let us denote the ratio of $x\tau$ to $x_{0}$ by m, namely,
$x_{T}=\dot{m}x_{0}$ , (45)
where m $>1$ . We call m the ’size differential ratio’ in the following. Using this
variable, we can rewrite (45) as follows:
N $=A(1-m^{-\rho})x_{0}^{\rho}$. (46)
Similarly, total output, X, is given by
$X= \int_{\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{O}}}^{ae_{T}}xn(x)dx=\frac{\rho A}{\rho-1}(1-m^{1-p})x_{0}^{1-p}$ . (47)
Total output here is measured by the value added. We can also calculate total
labor employment, $L$ , and total capital stock, $K$, by taking into account (30)
and (31), to get
L $= \int_{\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{O}}}^{\mathrm{r}\tau}l(x)n(x)dx=\frac{\rho Ac}{\rho-\lambda}(1-m^{\lambda-\rho})x_{0}^{\lambda-\rho}$ , (48)
$K= \int_{\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{O}}}^{x\tau}k(x)n(x)dx=\frac{\rho Ad}{\rho-\mu}(1-m^{\mu-p})x_{0}^{\mu-\rho}$. (49)
In the last section, $\mu$ is assumed to be unity when we show that the size dis-
tribution of ffims becomes the Pareto dist ribution under the learning by doing
hypothesis. We will keep this assumption in the following analysis. In this case,
(49) becomes as
$K= \frac{\rho Ad}{\rho-1}(1-m^{1-\rho})x_{0}^{1-p}=dX$ . (30)
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Let us next examine the determination of wages and profits. As is expressed
by equation (33), we assume that the wage rate increases with size at arate $\omega$ .
When the wage rate of aminimum size firm is $w(x\mathrm{o})$ , that of afirm with size
x, namely $w(x)$ , is given by
$w(x)=w(x_{0})( \frac{x}{x_{0}})^{\mathrm{t}t}$ (51)
As for the determination of $\mathrm{w}(\mathrm{x}\mathrm{q})\}$ we assume that aminimum size firm (or we
may $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ them a’marginal firm’) set pruduct price $P$ with mark-up factor 4on
wage costs.
$P=.\beta^{\underline{W(x\mathrm{o})4^{x_{0}}\underline{)}}}x_{0}l$, (52)
where $W(x\mathrm{o})$ denotes the nominal wage rate paid by amaginal firm. We assume
that marginal firms are under perfect competition, so that mark-up factor $\beta$ is
determ ined at the level just sufficient to cover capital costs. Then, the real wage
rate of atypical $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\tilde{\mathrm{r}}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{i}$ $\dot{\mathrm{n}}$al firm, $w(x\mathrm{o})\equiv W(x\mathrm{o})/P$ , is determined as
$w(x \mathrm{o})=\frac{1}{\beta}\frac{x_{0}}{l(x_{0})}=\frac{1}{\beta c}x_{0}^{1-\lambda}$ . (53)
Thus, the real wage rate of amarginal firm depends on its output, $x_{0}$ , and
technological coefficient, $c$ .
In our model, all the new entrants into the economy are small $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\alpha \mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}$
of minimum size. They will grow by improving their technology through ex-
perience. As successful firms expand their scale, they will, on the average, be
able to reduce their costs through learning by doing processes. Especially, when
$\lambda+\omega<1$ and $\mu=1$ , the larger firms attain more favorable profit margins than
smaller firms.
from (47), (48), (51) and (53), the aggregate share of wages in. value added,
$S_{w}$ , becomes as
$S_{w}= \frac{\rho-1}{\beta(\rho-\lambda-\omega)}\frac{1-m^{\lambda+\omega-\rho}}{1-m^{1-\rho}}$ . (54)
Thus, the aggregate share of wages in value added depends on the Pareto ooef-
ficient, $\rho$ , the degree of economies of scale, $\lambda$ , the wage differentials, $\omega$ , the size
differential ratio, $m$, and the mark-up factor, $\beta$. If $\lambda+\omega=1$ , it is obvious from
(54) that $S_{w}=1/\beta$. If $\lambda+\omega<1$ , however, the aggregate income shares depend
not only on the mark-up factor of marginal firms, $\beta$ , but also on the structural
parameters of the economy, such as $\rho$, $\lambda$ , $\omega$ , and $m$. This theory of income
shares is quite different ffom the neoclassical marginal productivity $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{r}\mathrm{y}^{10}$.
Assuming that $\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ , we can prove by comparative static analysis of
equation (54) that the aggregate wage share, $S_{w}$ , depends on its determinants
as $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$:
$\frac{\partial S_{w}}{\partial\rho}>0$, $\frac{\partial S_{w}}{\partial\lambda}>0$ , $\frac{\partial S_{w}}{\partial\omega}>0$ , $\frac{\partial S_{w}}{\partial\beta}<0$ , $\frac{\partial S_{w}}{\partial m}<0$. (55)
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In other words, the aggregate wage share increases with $\rho$, $\lambda$ and $\omega$ , and dimin-
ishes with $\beta$ and $m$. An increase in $\rho$ represents areduction in the proportion
of large firms, and hence in the average profit margin in the whole population of
firms. An increase in Arepresents adecrease in the degree of economies of scale,
and hence areduction in the profit margins of larger firms. An increase in $\omega$
represents an increase in the wage $\cdot \mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$. ial paid by large firms, and hence a
reduction in their profit margins. An increase in 4represents an increase in the
mark-up factor of amarginal firm, and hence an increase in the profit margin of
all firms. An increase in $m$ represents an increase in size differential, and hence
an increase in the profit margin of larger&ms.
5AModel of Growth with Economies of Scale
In this section, we will construct agrowth model that takes into account the size
distribution of firms, and examine the dynamics of aggregate variables obtained
in the previous section. Taking the time derivatives of equations (46), (47), (48)
and (49), we can express the growth rates of $N$, $X$ , $N$ , and $K$ , as follows:
$\frac{N\prime}{N}=\frac{A\prime}{A}+\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1}\frac{m}{m}$
.
$- \rho\frac{x0}{x_{0}}.$ , (56)
$\frac{\dot{X}}{X}=\frac{\dot{A}}{A}+\frac{\rho-1}{n\mathcal{V}^{-1}-1}\frac{m}{m}$
.
$-( \rho-1)\frac{\dot{x}_{0}}{x_{0}}$ , (57)
$\frac{\dot{L}}{L}.=\frac{\dot{A}}{A}+\frac{c}{c}$
.
$+ \frac{\rho-\lambda}{m^{\rho-\lambda}-\lambda}\frac{\dot{m}}{m}-(\rho-\lambda)\frac{x_{0}’}{x0}$ , (58)
$\frac{\dot{K}}{K}=\frac{\dot{A}}{A}+\frac{\dot{d}}{d}+\frac{\rho-1}{m^{\rho-1}-1}\frac{\dot{m}}{m}-(\rho-1)\frac{x_{0}}{x_{0}}.$ . (59)
Thus, all these growth rates depend on the rate of shift in the Pareto curve, $A^{\cdot}/A$ ,
the rate of increase in the size differential ratio, $\dot{m}/m$, and the rate of gowth
in output of amarginal firm, $x.0/x0$ . In addition to them, the growth rate of $L$
depends on the rate of change in the labor input coefficient $c$, and the gowth
rate in $K$ depends on the rate of change in the capital input coefficient, $d$. As is
obvious ffom (30), adecrease in $c$ leads to areduction in labor input per unit of
output for every size class of firms. If there is exogenous technological progress
that is common to all firms, $c./c$ takes negative value. Thus, $(-\cdot c./c)$ represents
$\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}- \mathrm{a}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\grave{\mathrm{g}}$ technological $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\dot{\mathrm{o}}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{r}\infty$. Similarly, as is obvious from (31), a
decrease in $d$ leads to areduction in capital input $\mathrm{p}\dot{\alpha}$ unit of output for every
size class of firms. Therefore, $(-\dot{d}/d)$ represents capital-augmenting technolog-
ical progress. In the following, we assume that there is no capital-augmenting
technological progress, so that $d$ is constant
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It is assumed in our model that new entrants start their operation at the
minimum size $x_{0}$ , and that the proportion aof the increment in total output,
$\dot{X}$ , is apportioned to new firms, $\acute{N}$ . In other words, we have
$\alpha\dot{X}=x_{0}\dot{N}$ , (60)
which can be rewritten as
$\frac{N}{N}$
.
$= \alpha\frac{X}{x_{0}N}\frac{\dot{X}}{X}$ . (61)
Substituting (46) and (47) into this equation, and $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{d}\zeta \mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ into account the rela-
tion $\rho=1/a(1-\alpha)$ , we obtain the following relationship between the growth
rate of output and the growth rate of the number of firms:
$\frac{\dot{N}}{N}=\frac{\rho-(1/a)}{\rho-1}\frac{M-m}{m^{\rho}-1}\frac{\dot{X}}{X}$ . (62)
We assume here that $\rho>1\geq 1/a$ holds. The condition $\rho>1$ is required for the
size distribution of firms to converge to the Pareto distribution. The condition
$a\geq 1$ holds true since we assume $\lambda+\omega\leq 1$ . Now, substituting (56) into (62),







$+ \rho\frac{\dot{x}_{0}}{x0}$ . (63)
As for the supply of labor, we assume that the population of labor grows at a
constant rate, $n$ . We also assume that the labor market is always in equilibrium.
Then, we have
$\frac{L\prime}{L}=n$. (64)
To complete the model, we have to $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{i}\theta$ the equation for the capital
accumulation. In our model, we assume that affaction of $s_{p}$ of total profits and
afraction of $s_{w}$ of total wages are saved and devoted to investment, and that
05 $s_{w}<s_{p}<1$ . For simplicity, we assume that there is no depreciation of
capital. Then the growth rate of capital is expressed by the following $\eta \mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ :
$\frac{K}{K}$
.
$= \frac{X}{K}[s_{p}(1-S_{w})+s_{w}S_{\tau v}]$ , (65)
where $S_{w}$ is the share of wages in value added defined by (54). It is adecreasing
function with respect to $m$ as is shown by (55). In other words, $S_{w}$ may be
denoted as $S_{w}(m)$ , whose derivative becomes as $S_{w}’(m)<0$.
In view of. (50), we have $K=dK$. As is me.ntiond above, $d$ is assumed to




$= \frac{1}{d}[(s_{p}-s_{w})\{1-S_{w}(m)\}+s_{w}]$ . (66)
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Since $S_{w}(m)$ is adecreasing function of m, the growth rate of X is an increasing
function of m. Thus, if we denote the growth rate of X as gx, equation (66)
may be rewritten as follows:
$\frac{\dot{X}}{X}=g_{X}(m)=\frac{1}{d}[(s_{p}-s_{w})\{1-S_{w}(m)\}+s_{w}]$ , $g_{X}(m)>0$. (67)
To summarize, independent equations in the above model are (56) through
(59), (62), (63), (64) and (66), and the variables to be determined are $N$, $X,L,K,A,m$
and $x_{0}$ . Thus, our model consists of 7equations which include 7variables, so
that it is complete. This model can be reduced to asystem consisting of two
equations as follows. Substituting (63) into (57), and using the notation $g\mathrm{x}$ $(m)$
for the growth rate of $X$ , we have
$( \frac{\rho-1}{m^{\rho-1}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1})\frac{\dot{m}}{m}+\frac{\dot{x}_{0}}{x_{0}}=(1-\frac{\rho-(1/a)}{\rho-1}\frac{m^{\rho}-m}{m^{\rho}-1})g_{X}(m)$ . (68)
This condition represents the equilibrium condition for the capital goods market.
Similarly, substituting (63) and $\downarrow(64)$ into (58)., we have
$( \frac{\rho-\lambda}{m^{\rho-\lambda}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1})\frac{\dot{m}}{m}+\lambda\frac{x_{0}’}{x_{0}}=(n+g)-\frac{\rho-(1/a)}{-_{\rho-1}}\frac{m^{\rho}-m}{m^{\rho}-1}g_{X}(m)$, {69)
where $g\equiv-\dot{c}/c$ represents the rate of exogenous technological progress. This
equation represents the equilibrium condition for the labor market. The system
consisting of (68) and (69) includes two variables, $m$ and Xoy so that it is $\uparrow \mathrm{a}$
complete system.





$= \frac{1}{D(m)}[\Phi(m)g_{X}(m)-(n+g)]$ , (70)
where
$D(m) \equiv\lambda(\frac{\rho-1}{m^{\rho-1}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1})-(\frac{\rho-\lambda}{m^{\rho-\lambda}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1})$ , (71)
$\Phi(m)\equiv\lambda+(1-\lambda)\frac{\rho-(1/a)}{\rho-1}\frac{M-m}{m^{\rho}-1}$. (72)
The expression of $D(m)$ seems quite complicated, but it can be shown that it
takes the positive value for the relevant range of $m$. Actually, it is proved that
there exists acertain value of $m$ denoted by $\overline{m}$ such that both of them are
positive for $m>\overline{m}$ :
$D(m)>0$ for $m>\overline{m}$ . (63)
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The magnitude of $\overline{m}$ is small enough compared to the practically relevant range
of $m$ , so that we may safely asuume that $D(m)>0$ always holds in our model.
As for (72), on the other hand, it is easily seen that
$\Phi(m)>0$ and $\Phi’(m)>0$ for m $>1$ . (74)
Next, if we solve the above system of equations (68) and (69) with respect






Both of these functions are shown to be positive for $m>1$ :
$\Psi(m)>$. 0 and $\Omega(m)>0$ for m $>1$ . (74)
Thus, the dynamic determination of our system proceeds as follows. $\infty \mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}-$
tion (70) determines the dynamic path of $m$ starting ffom its initial value. Cor-
responding to the path $o\mathrm{f}m$, the growth rate of output, $g_{X}$ $(m)$ , is determined by
(67), $\mathrm{a}\eta \mathrm{d}$ the minimum size of firms, $x_{0}$ is determined by (75). The growth rate
of capital, $g_{K}(m)$ , is always equal to the growth rate of output, $g_{X}(m)$ , under
the assumption of fixes coefficients. This assumption will be relaxed later.
In view of the dynamic equation (70), the steady growth equilibrium is
attained at $m^{*}$ that satisfies the following equation:
$g_{X}(m^{*})= \frac{1}{d}[(s_{p}-s_{w})\{1-S_{w}(m^{*})\}+s_{w}]=\frac{n+g}{\Phi(m^{l})}$ . (79)
This equation exhibits quite interesting implications of our model. First of all,
our model is different the Solow model in that the steady growth rate depends
not only on the sum of population growth and technological progress, $n+g$,
but also on economies of scale arising from learning by doing of firms. As we
will show below, $0<\Phi(m^{*})<1$ , and hence the steady growth rate of output,
$g\mathrm{x}(m^{*})$ , is greater than $n+g$. The ffinction $\Phi(m^{*})$ reflects economies of scale,
and $i\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ smaller its value, the larger the effects of economies of scale. The
contribution of economies of scale to the steady growth rate may be measured
by
$g_{X}.(m^{*})-(n+g)=(n+g) \frac{1-\Phi(m\Delta^{\mathrm{r}}}{-_{\Phi(m)}}.\cdot$ (80)
Secondly, in contrast to the Solow model in which the steady gowth rate
is independent of the saving rate, in our model, it is increasing with the saving
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rates, $s_{p}$ or $s_{w}$ . This can be shown as follows. In view of (79), the growth rate
of output, $g_{X}$ depends not only on to but also on $s_{p}$ and $s_{w}$ . To make it explicit,
we may write the steady growth rate of output as $gx$ $(m^{*};s_{p},s_{w})$ . This function
has the properties that $\partial gx/\partial s_{p}>0$ and $\partial g_{X}/\partial s_{w}>0$. Calculating the effects
of changes in $s_{p}$ or $s_{w}$ on $m^{*}$ from (79), we have
$\frac{dm^{*}}{ds_{p}}=$ $<0$ , $\frac{dm^{l}}{ds_{w}}=-\frac{\frac{\partial}{}\partial\epsilon_{w}\infty/g_{X}}{(g_{\acute{X}}/g\mathrm{x})+(\Phi’/\Phi)}<0$, (81)
where $g_{X}^{l}$ and $\Phi’$ denote derivatives of $gx$ and $\Phi$ w\’ith raep$.\mathrm{e}$ct to $m’$ . These
results show that increases in $s_{p}$ or $s_{w}$ decreases $m^{*}$ . But adecrease in $m^{\mathrm{r}}$
deoeaesae $\Phi(m^{*})$ in view of (74), and hence increases $gx$ $(m^{*})$ in view of (79).
Thus, increases in the saving rates leads to arise in the steady growth rate in
our model.
Let us next examine how the growth rate of output of aminimum firm,
$x_{0}./x_{0}$ , is determined at the steady state equilibrium. Substituting (79) into
(75), we get, after simplifying,
$( \frac{\dot{x}_{0}}{x_{0}})^{*}=\frac{n+g}{1-\lambda}\frac{1-\Phi(m^{*})}{\Phi(m^{\mathrm{s}})}$ . (82)
Comparing this expression with (80), we find that the larger the degree of
economies of scale, the higher the steady gowth rate of $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\cdot \mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}$ aminimum
firm.
We have to notice that there exists alower limit to this growth rate. In view
of (30), the labor input function for aminimum firm is written as $b$ $=oe_{0}^{\lambda}$ .
If we assume that the minimum firm is aone-man firm, then we must have
$1=\alpha_{0}^{\lambda}$ . Differentiating this relationship with resped to time and solving it for
the growth rate of $x_{0}$ , we obtain the following expression for the growth rate of
output of a $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\triangleright \mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}$ $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}$.
$( \frac{\dot{x}_{0}}{x_{0}})_{1}=-\frac{1}{\lambda}\frac{\dot{c}}{c}=\frac{g}{\lambda}$ . (83)
As long as the exogenous rate of technological progress, $g$ , is positive, this
expression must be positive. Since, minimum firms must be yaetoe than $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\triangleright$
ntan firms, we must have, from (82) and (83),
$\frac{n+g}{1-\lambda}\frac{1-\Phi(m^{*})}{\Phi(m^{l})}\geq\frac{g}{\lambda}.$ . (84)
Prom this inequality, it follows that $0<\Phi(m^{\mathrm{t}})<1$ .
The steady growth rate of output of aminimum ffim represented by (82)
decreases with $m.$ , since $\Phi(m^{*})$ is an increasing function. In other words, the
smaller the value of $m^{*}$ , the larger the degree of economies of scale, and hence
the larger the value of $(i_{0}/x_{0})^{*}$ . When $(\dot{x}_{0}/x_{0})^{\mathrm{s}}>g/\lambda$ holds, marginal firm
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including one-man firms are exiting, because their productivity growth is too
low. This case happens when larger firms are growing faster than one-man firms,
namely, $(\dot{x}_{T}/x_{T})>g/\lambda$ . When larger firms are growing fast, workers tend to
move to those those firms since they can get higher wages there. Marginal firms
are forced to exit as aresult.
In our model, firms with different size coexist, and they grow over time
by taking advantage of potential economies of scale through learning by d0-
\’ing. This feature of our model may seem somewhat similar to the endogenous
growth model of the Arrow type. However, our model differs ffom the existing
endogenous growth models in that it takes into account of the size distribution
of firms.
Let us next examine the $\dot{\mathrm{s}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}_{\dot{1}}1\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$ of the steady growth equilibrium derived
above. For this purpose we focus on the dynamic equation (70). It is adffleren-
tial equation that determines the path of $m$ over time. Since $D(m)$ , $\Phi(m)$ , and
$g_{X}(m)$ are all increasing functions, $m$. $/m$ increases with $m$ in the ndgb.$\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{d}$
of the steady state equilibrium, $m=m^{*}$ . Hence, the steady state equilibrium is
unstable. Figure 3provides agraphical representation of this instability prop-
erty. Suppose that $m>m^{\mathrm{r}}$ holds initially. Then, $m$ and $\dot{m}$$/m$ will increase
over time, and so will $g_{X}(m)$ . In this case, the equilibrium condition for $.\mathrm{t}$he
labor market (69) will be violated sooner or later. $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{v}\underline{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$ , suppose that
$m<m^{*}$ holds initially. Then, $m$ and $\dot{m}/m$ decreases over time, and so will
$gx(m)$ . In this case, the equilibrium condition for the capital goods market
(68) will be violated sooner or later. Thus, the steady growth equilibrium will
not be maintained, unless $m=m^{*}$ is satisfied initially.
6Factor Substitution and the Stability of the
Steady Growth Equilibrium
So far we have assumed that the production process for each size of firms is
characterized by fixed coefficients, so that afixed amounts of labor and capital
are used corresponding to agiven amount of output. In this section, we take
into account the substitutability between labor and capital, and show that it
stabilizes the $\mathrm{r}$ .
When there is substitutability between labor and capital, the production
function of atypical firm with size $x$ may be expressed as
x $=F$ ($\frac{1}{\gamma(x)}l$ , $\frac{1}{\delta(x)}k$), (85)
where $\gamma(x)$ and $\delta(x)$ are the learning functions defined by (28) and (29). We
assume that this production function exhibits constant returns to scale and other
neoclassical properties. We also keep the assumption for the learning function
$\delta(x)=dx^{\mu-1}$ , that $\mu=1$ and $d$ is constant. So, we may put $\delta(x)=1$ for
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convenience. For simplicity, we specify the production function as the Cobb-
Douglas type. With these assumptions, we can rewrite (85) as follows:
x $=( \frac{l}{\gamma(x)})^{1-\eta}k^{\eta}=\frac{l}{\gamma(x)}(\gamma(x)\frac{k}{l})^{\eta}$ , where $0<\eta<1$ . (88)
typical firm with size $x$ , chooses an optimum capital-labor ratio that mini-
mize the total cost, given the level of output and technological knowledge. Thus,
the problem for the typicil firm is formulated as follows:
$\min wl+rk$ , $\mathrm{s}.\mathrm{t}.\overline{x}=\frac{l}{\overline{\gamma}}$ $(\begin{array}{l}-k\gamma\overline{l}\end{array})$ . (87)
The first order condition for this minimization problem is
$\frac{w}{r}=\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}\frac{k}{l}$ . (88)
Solving this equation with respect to $k/l$ , and substituting it into (86), we can
express the production function (86)
x $= \frac{l}{\gamma(x)}(\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}\frac{\gamma(x)w}{r})^{\eta}$ , (89)
where $\gamma(x)w$ represents the wage rate $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\acute{\mathrm{r}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\dot{\mathrm{i}}$ciency unit of labor for atypical
firm with size $x$ , which will be denoted by $w^{\mathrm{e}}(x)$ in the following. Then, this
production function may be transformed into the labor-input function of afirm
with size $x$ as follows:
$\frac{l(x)}{x}=\theta(\frac{w^{\epsilon}(x)}{r})^{-\eta}\gamma(x)$ , (90)
where $\mathit{0}\equiv\{\eta/(1-\eta)\}^{-\eta}$ . Compare this function with the learning function (26).
Then, this function may be interpreted as the generalize$\mathrm{d}$ learning function that
takes into account the substitutability between labor and capital.
In our model, the wage rate for each size of ffims is determined endogenously
by (51) and (53), but the rate of interest is given exogenously. So, we assume $r$
to be constant, and put it equal to unity for convenience. We use (28) for the
learning function $\gamma(x)$ . Then, (90) is rewritten as
$l(x)=\mathrm{c}\{w^{\mathrm{e}}(x)\}^{-\eta}x^{\lambda}$ , (91)
where constant parameter 0is ignored without loss of gpnerarity. Rrom the
definition of to’(x), we can express it in terms of the wage rate per man-hour
labor, to, as
$w^{e}(x)=\gamma(x)w=woe^{\lambda-1}$ . (92)
But, $w$ is also afunction of $x$ , as is shown by (51). Hence, we have
to’(x) $=cx_{0}^{-\omega}w(x_{0})x^{\lambda+\{v-1}$ . (93)
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we assume $\lambda+\omega\leq 1$ , we must have $\lambda^{J}\geq\lambda$ .
Substituting (94) into (48), we can calculate the total labor employment as
follows:
L $= \int_{x_{0}}^{\mathrm{r}_{T}}l(x)n(x)dx=$ (96)
The wage rate for amarginal $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m},w(x\mathrm{o})$ , is determined by $w(x\mathrm{o})=(.1/\beta)\{x\mathrm{o}/l(x\mathrm{o})\}$,
as is shown by (53). Substituting (94) into this relation, and solv$\dot{\acute{\mathrm{m}}}\mathrm{g}$with respect
to $w(x_{0})$ , we have
$w(x_{0})= \frac{1}{c}(\frac{1}{\beta})^{1-\eta}" x_{0}^{1-\lambda}$ . (96)
Substituting this equation into (95) and arranging it, we obtain the total em-
ployment as follows:
L $= \frac{\rho A\mathrm{c}\beta^{\eta/(1-\eta)}}{\rho-\lambda},(1-m^{\lambda’-\rho})x_{0}^{\lambda’-\rho-e}$, (97)
where $\epsilon=\eta(1-\lambda-\omega)$ and $\lambda’=\lambda+\epsilon$ . Differentiating (97) with respect to time,





$+ \frac{\dot{\mathrm{c}}}{c}+\frac{\rho-\lambda’}{n\theta^{-\lambda’}-1}\frac{\dot{m}}{m}+(\rho-\lambda’+\epsilon)\frac{x_{0}}{x_{0}}.$ . (98)
Thus, when we take into consideration the substitutability between capital and
labor, the equation for the level of employment (48) is replaced by (97), and the
equation for the growth rate of employment (58) is replaced by (98). The share
of wages in the value added (54) is also replaced by
$S_{w}= \frac{\rho-1}{\beta(\rho-\lambda’-\omega)}\frac{1-m^{\lambda’+\omega-p}}{1-m^{1-\rho}}$ . (99)
Similarly, we can caluculate the capital-input function and total capital stock
for this case. The capital-input function of afirm with size $x$ becomes as
$k(x)=d\{w^{e}(x)\}^{1-\eta}x$ , (100)
and the total capital stock becomes as
$K= \frac{\rho Ad\beta^{-1}}{\rho+\kappa-1}(1-m^{1-p-\kappa})x_{0}^{1-p}$ , (101)
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where $\kappa$ $=(1-\eta)(1-\lambda-\omega)$ . Then, from (47) and (100), the total output-capital
ratio becomes as
$\frac{X}{K}=\frac{d(\rho+\kappa-1)}{\beta(\rho-1)}\frac{1-m^{1-\rho}}{1-m^{1-\rho-\kappa}}$. (102)
This equation shows that, unless $\kappa$ $=0$, the output-capital ratio is not constant
as in the fixed coefficient case, but depends on $m$. Differentiating this equation
with respect to time, we obtain the following relationship between the growth
rate of output and the growth rate of capital:
$\frac{\dot{X}}{X}=\frac{\dot{K}}{K}+(\frac{\rho-1}{nV-m}-\frac{\rho+\kappa-1}{m^{\rho+\kappa-1}-m})\frac{m\prime}{m}$. (103)
Thus, the growth rate of output deviates from the growth rate of capital if $\kappa$ $\neq 0$
and $m$. $\neq 0$ .
Let us assume as before that the growth rate of capital is determined by
(65). Then, substituting.(102) into (65) yields
$\frac{\dot{K}}{K}=g_{K}(m)=\frac{d(\rho+\kappa-1)}{\beta(\rho-1)}\frac{1-m^{1-\rho}}{1-m^{1-\rho-\kappa}}[(s_{p}-s_{w})(1-S_{w})+s_{w}]$. (104)
where $S_{w}$ is defined by (99). It is easily shown that equation (99) is increasing
and equation (102) is decreasing with respect to $m$, and hence $g_{K}(m)$ is an









$\Theta(m)\equiv(1-\frac{\rho-(1/a)}{\rho-1}\frac{m^{\rho}-m}{mP-1}.)(\frac{\rho-1}{m^{\rho}-m}-\frac{\rho+\kappa-1}{m^{\rho+\kappa-1}-m})>0$ for $m>1$ .
(107)
Equation (106) represents the equilibrium condition for the capital goods market
in the case where capital and labor are substitutable. Thus, equation (68) in
the fixed coefficient model is changed to (106) when the factor substitutability
is taken into account.
Similarly, the equilbrium condition for the labor market is obtained by sub-




$\Lambda(m)\equiv\frac{\rho-(1/a)}{\rho-1}\frac{m^{p}-m}{m^{\rho}-1}(\frac{\rho-1}{m^{\rho}-m}-\frac{\rho+\kappa-1}{m^{\rho+\kappa-1}-m})>0$ for m $>1$ . (109)
Thus, equation (69) in the fixed coefficient model is changed to (100) when the
factor substitutability is taken into account.
Solving $(\mathrm{i}^{\mathrm{I}}06)$ and (108) with respect to $m$
.
$/m$, we obtain the following dy-
namic equation for the firm size ratio:
$\frac{\dot{m}}{m}=\frac{1}{\Delta(m)}[\Phi(m)g_{K}(m)-(n+g)]$ , (110)
where
$\Delta(m)\equiv D(m;\lambda^{l})-\Pi(m)$ . (Ill)
Here, $D(m;\lambda^{l})$ represents the same expression as (71) except that Ais replaced
by $\lambda’=\lambda+\epsilon$ , and hence $D(m;\lambda’)>0$. It is $\dot{\mathrm{a}}$ffiumd here that $\lambda’<1.\cdot$ On
the other hand, $\Pi(m)$ represents the following expression, which is proved to be
$\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}^{15}$
$\Pi(m)\equiv\epsilon$ $( \frac{\rho-1}{m^{\rho-1}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1}).+(\lambda’-\epsilon)\Theta(m)+\Lambda(m)>0$ for m $>1$ . (112)
The steady state quUibrium of (110) is attained at m. that satisfies
$g_{K}(m^{*})= \frac{n+g}{\Phi(m^{*})}$ . (108)
This equation is the same as (79) except that $gx(m)$ is replaced by $g_{K}(m)$ , and
this function is defined by (104). Since $g_{K}^{r}(m)>0$, the steady state solution
has qualitatively similar properties as in the fixed coefficient model.
How about the stabilty of this model. Prom (111), we have $\Delta(m)<0$
if $D(m;\lambda^{l}).<\mathrm{I}(m)$ . This condition is satisfied if the magnitudes of $\epsilon$ and $\kappa$
are sufficiently large. Prom the definition of these parameters, $\epsilon$ and $\kappa$ are the
larger, the larger $1-\lambda-\omega$ . In this case, the steady state equilibrium for (110)
is locally stable, since $\dot{m}/m$ is decreasing with $m$ in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium value of $m$ denoted by $m^{*}$ . Figure 4shows this stability property.
Suppose that $m>m^{*}$ holds initially. Then, since $\dot{m}/m<0$ , $m$ will decrease
over time, until it gets equal to $m^{*}$ . Conversely, if $m<m^{*}$ , then $\dot{m}/m>0$ ,
so that $m\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$ increase over time until it reaches $m^{*}.$ .Thus, we find that the
substitutability between capital and labor serves as astabilizing factor.
The behavior of aggregate variables on the steady growth path in our model
is similar to that in the Solow model. The steady growth of our model is oonsis-
tent with Kaldor’s ’stylized facts’ as is the case in the Solow model. However,
our model differs ffom the Solow model greatly in that it includes many struc-
tural parameters or variables of the economy, such as the Pareto coefficient, $\rho$,
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the learning coefficient, $\lambda$ , the wage differential rate, $\omega$ , or the size differential
ratio, $m$ . So our model gives more abundant implications about growth than
the Solow model.
Let us examine how those parameters affect the steady state equilibrium.
We first examine the effects of $\dot{\mathrm{a}}$ change in $\rho$ . In the steady growth equilibrium
condition (113), it ihould be noted that both $g_{K}(m^{*})$ and $\Phi(m^{*})$ are functions
of $\rho$ . To take it into consideration explicitly, we may express those functions as
$g_{K}(m^{*};\rho)$ and $\Phi(m^{*}\cdot.\rho|)$ . It can be shown that $\partial g_{K}/\partial\rho<0$ and $\partial\Phi/\partial\rho<0$,
though we omit the proof for saving space. Then, the effects of achange in $\rho$
on $m^{*}$ is derived from (113) as follows:
$\frac{dm^{*}}{d\rho}=-\frac{(_{\partial\rho}^{\underline{\partial}_{\mathrm{f}1K}}/g_{K})+(\frac{\partial\Phi_{\iota}}{\Phi}\underline{/\Phi)}}{\overline{(g_{K}’/g}_{K})+(\Phi’/\Phi)}>0$, (114)
$\frac{dm^{*}}{d\lambda}$ $\frac{\leq}{>}0$ , $\frac{dm^{*}}{\mathrm{d}v}=-\frac{\underline{\epsilon}_{AK/\partial\omega g_{\underline{K}}}}{\overline{(g_{K}’/}\overline{g}_{K}\overline{)}+(\Phi’/\Phi)}>0$.
(113)
In other words, the effect of an increase in A($ie.$ , adecrease in learning by
doing .effeck) on $m^{*}$ is indefinite, because it affects $g_{K}$ and (I) in the opposite
direction. On the other hands, an increase in $\omega(\dot{l}.e.$ , an increase in the wage
differential with respect to size) leads to an increase in the size differential ratio,
$m$, which will in turn lead to adecrease in the growth rate of amarginal firm,
$i_{0}/x_{0}$ . Thus, an increase in the wage differential tends to benefit the survival
of marginal firms.
It should be noted that changes in $\rho$ may not be independent of changes in
Aor $\omega$ . In Proposition 4, we have shown that $a \frac{\geq}{<}1$ depending on $\lambda+\omega\frac{\leq}{>}.1$ .
Thus, an increase in Aor $\omega$ leads to adecrease in $a$ , and hence to an increase $\mathrm{n}$
$\rho$ . Therefore, though the effect of an increase in Aon $m$ is indefinite by itself, it
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will most likely increase $m$ when its effect through $\rho$ is also taken into account.
An increase in $\omega$ will lead to an increase in $m$ by itself and by its the effect
$\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{u}\cdot \mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}$
$\rho$ as well.
The effects of changes in these parameters on the growth rate of total out-
put is indeterminate, because their $\mathrm{d}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\cdot \mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$ effects and indirect effaets through $m$
work in the opposite directions. Take achange in $\rho$ for example. An increase in
$\rho$ decreases $\Phi(m^{*})$ in (113) for given $m^{*}$ , and hence the steady rate of growth.
However, as is shown by (114), it increases $m^{*}$ at the same time, and hence
increase $\Phi(m^{*})$ . As the result, the total effects of achange in $\rho$ on the steady
rate of growth is indeterminate. To summarize, an increase in the Pareto coef-
ficient, $\rho$ , leads to amore equal size distribution of firms by benefiting smaller
firms. But its ffiaet on the steady rate of growth is uncertain.
Finally, it should be noted that achange in $\rho$, if it may happen, is avery
slow process. An increase in the rate of entry of new firms, $\cdot\alpha$, doae not change
$\rho$ immediately, $\mathrm{b}\propto \mathrm{a}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\cdot \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}$ firms are incumbent firms. It will take so many
years for new firms to grow to become larger firms.
7Conclusion
The size distribution of ffim in Japanese manufacturing, the data of whiffi are
available ffom the Census of Manufacturae, $\varpi \mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}$ a baeutiful illustration of
the Pareto law, not just fqr some particular ya.ers but over many years. This
interesting empirical fact has motivated me to write this paper.
This paper makes two new attempts. First, Ihave explained why the Pareto
law applies to the size distribution of firms based on the assumption that ffims
acquire the technology of operating efficiently on a larger scale through laerning
by doing and expand their scale of operation through aoeumulation of capital
induced by profitability. Second, Iset up amodel of economic growth that is
based on the Pareto distribution of firms and economies of scale.
It is found that the learning by doing hypothesis is quite suitable for ex-
plaining how the size distribution of firms tends to be the Pareto distribution.
Especially, the coefficient for learning by doing effects, in
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}|\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ to the bkth
rate of new firms, is found to be related to the Pareto coefficient. The deriva-
tion of the Pareto distribution, which owae to Simon (1955), is carried out by a
stochastic process model. Thus, the Pareto distribution is attained through the
evolutionary process of changes in position of individual firms. In this sense,
our model is not an equilibrium model, but akind of evolutionary model.
Based on this microeconomic foundation, we construct amodel of ae0-
more growth which takes into consideration the size distribution of firms and
economies of scale. In our model, firms with different size and
$\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\propto \mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ efficiency
coexist, forming aregular pattern of distribution, namely, the Pareto distrib-
ution. The steady growth quilibrium of our model can consistently
$\alpha \mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{i}$.
Kaldor’s stylized facts, as the Solow model does. But, in contrast to the Solow
model, the steady growth rate in our model depends not only on population
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growth and technological progress, but also on economies of scale generated
by learning by doing. Our model has some similarities to endogenous growth
models, but differs from them in that it take into account the size distribution




1. See also Simon and Bonini (1958) for some $\mathrm{U}.\mathrm{S}$ . data.
2. Taking logarithm of equation (1) and estimating the regression for the
data ffom Japanese manufacturing industry, we get the following result:
$\log N=6.38-1.17\log x(R^{2}=0.995)$
(0.06) (0.027
where the numerical value below each coefficient represents its standard error.
3. See Simon (1955) for such examples of the Pareto distribution.
4. Lyd.au (1998) criticim the $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}$-classical theory ofthe firm form this point
of view, and proposes an alternative theory. ffls ideas presented in his book is
quite interesting, and this paper owes to his ideas. However, he does not present
aformal model.
5. The form of the learning function assumed here $\mathrm{k}$ the same as Arrow’s ex-
cept that we take capacity output of an individual firm as an index of experience
of the firm. It may be better to adopt cuinulative output rather than current
capacity output as an index of experience. However, as $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{f}\mathbb{I}$ be discussed later,
we assume that every firm starts their operation from the minimum size and
expands its scale of operation through learning by doing. Under $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\dot{\infty}$ aesump-
tion together with the assumption that output of atypical firm is increasing
exponentially, current capacity output of the firm is proportional to cumulative
output. Therefore, we can use the former variable as an index of experience.
6. Taking logarithm of these equations and estimating for the data kom
Japanese manufacturing industry, we get the following results:
$\log l=$ -0.51+0.83 $\log x$ $(R^{2}=0.999)$ ,
(0.02) $(0.\mathrm{m}\epsilon)$
$\log k=$ -0.13+1.005 $\log x$ $(R^{2}=0.999)$ ,
(0.03) (0.009)
where the new merical value below each coefficient represents its standard error.
These results show that $\lambda=0.83$ and $\mu=1.005$ in the case of Japanse manu-
faduring industry, and hence our assumption that $0<\lambda<1$ and $\mu\geq 1$ may be
justified. Moreover, the second regeression equation shows that the value of $\mu$
is approximately equal to 1. The assumption $\mu=1$ , which will be $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}_{1}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}$ later in
our model, may also $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{j}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\underline{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}$ in the case of Japanese manufacturing industry
by this result,
7. ${\rm Re} \mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ of this equation to the data of Japanese manufacturing indus-
try gives the following result:
$\log w=0.36+0.09$ $\log x$ $(R^{2}=0.978)$
(0.01) (0.04)
where numerical value below each coefficient represdents its standard error. This
result show that the positve relation between the wage rate and the size of firms
is statistically significant in the case of Japan ese manufacturing industry.
8. See note 6.
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9. In the case of Japanese manufacturing industry, $\lambda+\omega=0.83+0.09=0.91$ ,
in view of notes 6and 7. Hence, to assume $\lambda+\omega$ $\leq 1$ may be realistic.
10. This theory of income distribution was first presented by Lydall (1971).
The comparison of this theory with other theories of distribution is made in
detail by Lydall (1979).
11. See Appendix (A) for the $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}.\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}$ .
12. In recent macoroeconomics, more orthodox approach to the determina-
tion of saving is to assume that the households maximiz lifetime utility. As
Solow (2000) argues, howeyer, we lose very little, ffom the steady-state point
of view, by adopting the assumption of constant savings rates for profits and
wages. Moreover, this assumption is more consistent with the model of firms in
&ction.3 in which we assumed the existence of retained profits.
13. See Appendix (B) for the proof.
14. These are easily proved fiom (B.3) in Appendix (B).
15. It is easlily proved fiom (B.3) in Appedix (B) that functions $\Theta(m)$ , $\Lambda(m)$
and $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{m})$ are all positive
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Appendix
(A) Mathematical Notes to Section 4
We give here mathematical proofs to (55) in the text. The share of wages
in the value added is determined by (54), that is,
$S_{W}= \frac{\rho-1}{\beta(\rho-\lambda-\omega)}\frac{1-m^{\lambda+\{v-\rho}}{1-m^{1-\rho}}$ , $((\mathrm{A}.1))$
where it is assumed that $\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ . Under this assumption, we prove that
(55) holds for $m>1$ .
Proposition Al. $\partial S_{w}/\partial\rho>0$ , if $\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ and $\acute{m}>1$ .
proof Taking logarithm of (A.I) and differentiating it with respect to $\rho$ ,
we have
$\frac{1}{S_{w}}\frac{\partial S_{w}}{\partial\rho}$ $=$ $\frac{1}{\rho-1}-\frac{1}{\rho-\lambda-\omega}+\frac{1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}m}{m^{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-1}-\frac{1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}m}{m^{p-1}-1}$
$=$ $\frac{m^{p-1}[(1-\lambda-\omega)(m^{\rho-\lambda-\iota v}-1)(1-m^{1-\rho})+(\rho-1)(\rho-\lambda-\omega)(1-m^{1-\lambda-\omega})\log m]}{(\rho-1)(\rho-\lambda-\omega)(m^{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-1)(m^{\rho-1}-1)}$
The denominator of this last expression is positive since $\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$
and $m>1$ . To examine the numerator, we put the expression in $[]$ of the
numerator as $f(m)$ :
$\mathrm{f}(\mathrm{m})=(1-\lambda-\omega)(m^{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-1)(1-m^{1-\rho})+(\rho-1)(\rho-\lambda-\omega)(1-m^{1-\lambda-\omega})\log m$.
In order to prove $f(m)>0$ for $m>1$ , it is necessary and sufficient to prove
$f(1)\geq 0$ and $f’(m)>0$ for $m>1$ . Straightforwardly, we have $f(1)=0$. The
derivative $f(m)$ becomes, after some arrangement , as follows:
$f’(m)$ $=$ $m^{-\lambda-\omega}’[(1-\lambda-\omega)\{(\rho-\lambda-\omega)(m^{\rho-1}-1)+(\rho-1)(1-m^{\lambda+\omega-\rho})\}$
$-(\rho-1)(\rho-\cdot\lambda-\omega^{!})\{(1-\lambda-\omega)\log m-(1-m^{1-\lambda-\omega})\}]$ .
To prove the expression in $[]$ of the right hand side of this equation to be
positive, let us put it as $g(m)$ . Then, we have only to prove $g(1)\geq 0$ and
$g’(m)>0$ for $m>1$ . It is trivial that $g(1)=0$. Taking the derivative of $g(m)$
and arranging it, we have
$g’(m)=(\rho-1)(\rho-\lambda-\omega)(1-\lambda-\omega)m^{\rho-2}(1+m^{1-\lambda-\omega})(1-m^{\lambda+\omega-\rho})$.
Under the assumption that $\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ , we have $g’(m)>0$ for m $>1$ . This
concludes the proof.
Proposition A2. $\partial S_{w}/\partial\lambda>0\dot{f}f\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ and $m>1$ .
Proof Taking the logarithmic derivative of (A.I) with respect to $\lambda$ , we
obtain, after some arrangement, the following:
$\frac{1}{S_{w}}\frac{\partial S_{w}}{\partial\lambda}$ $=$ $\frac{1}{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-\frac{1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}m}{m^{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-1}$
$=$ $\frac{m^{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-1-(\rho-\lambda-\omega)1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}m}{(\rho-\lambda-\omega)(m^{p-\lambda-\omega}-1)}$.
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The denominator of this last expression is positive, since $\rho>\lambda+\omega$ . To examine
the numerator, let us put it as $f(m)$ :
$f(m)=m^{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-1-(\rho-\lambda-\omega)\log m$.
Then, we have $f(1)=0$. Taking the derivative of this function, we obtain
$f’(m)=m^{-1}(\rho-\lambda-\omega)(m^{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-1)$ .
This expression is positive for $m>1$ , since $\rho>\lambda+\omega$ . Hence, $f(m)>0$ , and
the proposition is proved.
Proposition A3. $\partial S_{w}/\partial\omega>0\dot{l}f\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ and $m>1$ .
Proof The same procedure as the proof of Proposition 2can be applied.
Proposition A4. $\partial S_{w}/\partial\beta<0\dot{l}f\rho>1$ $\geq\lambda+\omega$ and $m>1$ .
Proof $\mathrm{b}.\mathrm{v}\underline{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{l}}$ .
Proposition A5. $\partial S_{w}/3n<0\dot{\iota}f\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ and $m>1$ .
Proof $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{g}$ the logarithmic derivative of (A.I) with respect to m, we





The denominator of this last expression is $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{v}}\mathrm{e}$, since $\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ and
$m>1$ . $\mathrm{n}$ examine the numerator, we put it as $f(m)$ :
$f(m)=(\rho.-\lambda-\omega)(m^{\rho-1}-1)-(\rho-1)(m^{\rho-\lambda-\omega}-1)$.
Then, we have $f(1)=0$. nilng the derivative of this function we obtain
$f’(m)=(\rho-\lambda-\omega)(\rho-1)m^{\rho-2}(1-m^{1-\lambda-}’)$ .
This expression is negative for $m>1$ , since $\rho>1>\lambda+\omega$ . Hence, $f(m)<0$,
and the proposition is proved.
(B) Mathematical Notes to Section 5
(1) Properties of function $D(m)$ defined by (71) in the text.
Function $D(m)$ may be rewritten as follows defined as follows:
$D(m) \equiv\lambda[(\frac{\rho-1}{m^{p-1}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1})-\frac{1}{\lambda}(\frac{\rho-\lambda}{m^{\rho-\lambda}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1})]$ . $((\mathrm{B}.1))$
To examine the properties of this $/\mathrm{f}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$, let us define $\mathrm{f}\dot{\mathrm{f}}\mathrm{i}$nction $f(m,x)$ as
follows:
$f(m,x)$ $= \frac{1}{x}(\frac{\rho-x}{m^{\rho-\mathrm{r}}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{\rho}-1})$ , have $\rho>1\geq x>0$ and
$m>,,1\mathrm{r}\backslash \cdot\wedge\backslash \backslash$
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It is easy to prove that
$\frac{\rho-x}{m^{\rho-ae}-1}-\frac{\rho}{m^{p-1}}>0$ , if $\rho>1\geq x>0$ and m $>1$ . $((\mathrm{B}.3))$
Hence, we have $f(m,x)>0$ . Then, $D(m)$ is positve or negative depending
on whether $f_{\mathrm{g}}(m,x)$ is positive or negative. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma Bl: $Jbm$ exists some value of $m$ denoted by $\overline{m}$, which is larger
than 1, such that $f_{\mathrm{g}}(m,x)\geq 0dep<e,nd\dot{l}ng$ on whether $\dot{m}_{<}\geq\overline{m}$.
Proof Function $f(m,x)$ may be rewritten as follows:
$f(m,x)=$
Taking logarithmic derivative of this function, we obtain, after some arragement,
$\frac{f_{\mathrm{g}}(m,\Delta x}{f(m,x)}=$ ((B.4))
The denominator of the right hand side of this equation is positve. Hence,
this expression is positive or negative depending on whether the numerator is
positive or negative. We thus obtain
$f_{-}(m_{1}x)\overline{\overline{f(}m,x)}<\geq \mathrm{o}$ depending on whether $\frac{(m^{\rho}-1)1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}m}{m^{-}-\mathrm{l}}\geq<\frac{\rho}{x(\rho-x)}$ . $((\mathrm{B}.5))$
Let us put
$g(m) \equiv\frac{(m^{\rho}-1)1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}m}{m^{-}-\mathrm{l}}$ $((\mathrm{B}.6))$
Then, since $\rho>x$ , this function is shown to have the following properties:
$d(m)>0$ for m $>1$ , $\lim_{marrow 1}g(m)=0$ , $\lim_{marrow\infty}$. $g(m)=\infty$.
Therefore, there exists one and only one value of m, denoted by $\overline{m}$, such that
$\frac{(\overline{m}^{p}-1)1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}\overline{m}}{\overline{m}^{l}-\mathrm{l}}=\frac{\rho}{x(\rho-x)}$ . ((B.7))
Then, in view of (B.4), we have $f_{\mathrm{g}}(m,x)$ $\geq 0<$ depending on $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\dot{\varpi}m_{<}^{\geq}\overline{m}$ .
This completes the proof.
Propositlon Bl. There exists some value of $m$ denoted by $\overline{m}$, $wh\dot{w}h\dot{u}$
larger than 1, such that $D(m)\geq 0<$ depending on whether $m_{<}\geq\overline{m}$.
Proof By the above lemma, if $m>\overline{m}$ holds, $f(m,x)$ is an increasing
function $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{f}\dot{\mathrm{f}}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}$ respect to $m$. Hence, $f(m, 1)>f(m,\lambda)$ , since $\lambda<1$ . Then, we
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have $D(m)>0$ , in view of (B.I). The opposite holds if m $<\overline{m}$ . This concludes
the proof.
ANote on Proposition Bl. An important problem is whether $D(m)$ is
positive or negative for the economically range of $m$. To examine this problem,
let us consider the case $\rho=1.2$ and $\lambda=0.8$ , which appropriate for Japanese
manufacturing industry as awhole. Then, it is caluclated that $\overline{m}.=$. 18. In
other words, if the ratio of the largest ffifirm’s output to the smallest firm’s output
exceeds 18, then we have $D(m)>0$ . Obviously, this number of $\overline{m}$ is quite small
compared to the actually observed number. Therefore, we may safely assume
that $D(m)>0$ holds $\mathrm{s}$ in realty.
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Figure 1. Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium of the Firm
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Figure 3. Instability of the Steady Growth Equilibrium
Figure 4. Stability of the Steady Growth Equilibrium
$m$
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